Contact:
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School of Math. Sciences
University College Dublin
Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
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Joachim Rosenthal
Institut of Mathematics
University of Zurich
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Phone:
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ITW 2010 Dublin
IEEE Information Theory Workshop
Dublin, August 30 - September 3, 2010




Communication with secrecy constraints

Mon 30 Aug, 14.40-16.00, Room 2

Contributed session

Ananda T. Suresh, Arunkumar Subramanian, Andrew Thangaraj, Matthieu Bloch, and Steven W. McLaughlin
Strong Secrecy for Erasure Wiretap Channels

Abstract: We show that duals of certain low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, when used in a standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes with block length n and girth ≥ 2k, for some k ≥ 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of the ensemble is lmin, the expected probability of block error is O(1/(nceil(lmin k / 2) - k)) when the erasure probability ε < εef, where εef depends on the degree distribution of the ensemble. As long as lmin > 2 and k > 2, the dual of this LDPC code provides strong secrecy over a BEWC of erasure probability greater than 1 - εef.
Mon 30 Aug, 14.40-15.00, Room 2

Wei Kang and Nan Liu
Wiretap Channel with Shared Key

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of secure communication over a wiretap channel where the transmitter and the legitimate receiver share a secret key, which is concealed from the eavesdropper. We find the secrecy capacity under this scenario. This result generalizes that of Yamamoto, which is applicable only to less noisy wiretap channels, to the general wiretap channel when no distortion is allowed at the legitimate receiver.
Mon 30 Aug, 15.00-15.20, Room 2

Mohammad Hossein Yassaee and Mohammad Reza Aref
Multiple Access Wiretap Channels with Strong Secrecy

Abstract: The problem of secure communication over Multiple-Access Wiretap channel (MAC-WTC) under strong secrecy criterion is investigated. A new technique based on channel output statistics approximation is developed for establishing the strong security over multi-user channels. In particular, this technique shows that how simple wiretap coding results in secure communication under strong secrecy criterion instead of weak secrecy criterion. As a side result of the paper, two results on the output statistics of MAC are provided. Such results can be used to approximate the mutual information between input and output of MAC with respect to a given codebook of arbitrary rate.
Mon 30 Aug, 15.20-15.40, Room 2

Hyoungsuk Jeon, Daesung Hwang, Hyuckjae Lee, Jeongseok Ha, and Jinho Choi
Secure Type-Based Multiple Access: Transmission Strategy and Analysis for Perfect Secrecy

Abstract: Since wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to threats and attacks due to the nature of wireless communications between sensors and fusion center (FC), it is often necessary to secure transmissions from any possible eavesdropping. In this paper, we study the eavesdropping issue when sensors are over-deployed and the channels between sensors and the ally FC are modeled as time-varying Rayleigh fading channels. We propose a transmission scheme in which only the sensors of strong and weak channel gains report their decisions in a predetermined way based on type-based multiple access protocol. By taking advantage of random behaviors of wireless channels in the form of the multiuser diversity and carefully design different roles of sensors of strong and weak channel gains to the ally FC, the proposed scheme can confuse the enemy FC in making a decision. Eventually, it guarantees the perfect secrecy promised by an information theoretic measure. We also analyze detection error probability and equivocation at the ally and enemy FCs, respectively.
Mon 30 Aug, 15.40-16.00, Room 2

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