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Contact:
Marcus Greferath
School of Math. Sciences
University College Dublin
Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
Phone:
+353-1-716-2588 (UCD)
+353-85-153-0951 (mobile)
Joachim Rosenthal
Institut of Mathematics
University of Zurich
Winterthurerstrasse 190
8057 Zurich, Switzerland
Phone:
+41-44-63 55884 (office)
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ITW 2010 Dublin
IEEE Information Theory Workshop
Dublin, August 30 - September 3, 2010
Channel uncertainty
Fri 03 Sep, 09.55-13.05, Room 1
Invited session
Organizers: Navin Kashyap and Michael Langberg
Part I: Point-to-Point Communication
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Rudolf Ahlswede
Every channel with time structure has a capacity sequence
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Fri 03 Sep, 09.55-10.20, Room 1
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Anand D. Sarwate
Coding against myopic adversaries
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Abstract:
A variant on the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) is proposed in
which the jammer is allowed to base its actions on a noisy version
of the transmitted codeword. It is shown via a random coding
argument that the capacity is the minimum over all discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs) that can be induced by memoryless
strategies of the adversary. This generalizes two existing models
in the AVC literature: the standard AVC in which the jammer does not
know the channel input, and the AVC in which the jammer knows the
channel input exactly.
Fri 03 Sep, 10.20-10.45, Room 1
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Adam Smith
What can cryptography do for coding theory?
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Fri 03 Sep, 10.45-11.10, Room 1
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Ofer Shayevitz, Yuval Kochman
Estimation-aware coding
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Fri 03 Sep, 11.10-11.35, Room 1
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Part II: Network Communication and Coding
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Sidharth Jaggi, Morteza Alamgir
Network error-correction via obfuscated coding
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Fri 03 Sep, 11.50-12.15, Room 1
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MinJi Kim, Muriel Médard, and João Barros
A Multi-hop Multi-source Algebraic Watchdog
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Abstract:
In our previous work ('An Algebraic Watchdog for Wireless Network
Coding'), we proposed a new scheme in which nodes can detect
malicious behaviors probabilistically, police their downstream
neighbors locally using overheard messages; thus, provide a secure
global self-checking network. As the first building block of
such a system, we focused on a two-hop network, and presented a
graphical model to understand the inference process by which nodes
police their downstream neighbors and to compute the probabilities
of misdetection and false detection.
In this paper, we extend the Algebraic Watchdog to a more general
network setting, and propose a protocol in which we can establish
trust in coded systems in a distributed manner. We develop a
graphical model to detect the presence of an adversarial node
downstream within a general two-hop network. The structure of the
graphical model (a trellis) lends itself to well-known algorithms,
such as Viterbi algorithm, that can compute the probabilities of
misdetection and false detection. Using this as a building block, we
generalize our scheme to multi-hop networks. We show analytically
that as long as the min-cut is not dominated by the Byzantine
adversaries, upstream nodes can monitor downstream neighbors and
allow reliable communication with certain probability. Finally, we
present preliminary simulation results that support our analysis.
Fri 03 Sep, 12.15-12.40, Room 1
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Michael Langberg
Succinct fault tolerant network representations
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Fri 03 Sep, 12.40-13.05, Room 1
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