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Contact:
Marcus Greferath
School of Math. Sciences
University College Dublin
Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
Phone:
+353-1-716-2588 (UCD)
+353-85-153-0951 (mobile)
Joachim Rosenthal
Institut of Mathematics
University of Zurich
Winterthurerstrasse 190
8057 Zurich, Switzerland
Phone:
+41-44-63 55884 (office)
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ITW 2010 Dublin
IEEE Information Theory Workshop
Dublin, August 30 - September 3, 2010
Secure communication
Mon 30 Aug, 16.20-17.40, Room 3
Contributed session
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Willie K. Harrison, João Almeida, Demijan Klinc, Steven W. McLaughlin, and João Barros
Stopping Sets for Physical-Layer Security
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Abstract:
Physical-layer security based on wiretap codes can be used to
complement cryptographic applications at higher layers of the
protocol stack. We assume a passive eavesdropper that has access to
noise-corrupted codewords with erasures that are statistically
independent to those of the legitimate communication partners. Our
goal is to minimize the information leaked to the eavesdropper. In
this paper we present a low-complexity coding scheme for channels
with feedback, which employs extensive interleaving of carefully
punctured LDPC codewords. The key idea is to ensure that every
transmitted packet is crucial for successful decoding. This is
achieved by ensuring that stopping-set bit combinations for coded
blocks are distributed among different packets and by enforcing that
retransmission requests be restricted to the friendly parties. A
probabilistic analysis reveals that an eavesdropper who uses a
message-passing decoding algorithm will experience catastrophic
decoding failure with high probability. This encoder thus provides
physical-layer secrecy which is both independent from, and
complementary of, the cryptographic layer. The proposed scheme works
even when an eavesdropper has a better channel than the legitimate
receiver.
Mon 30 Aug, 16.20-16.40, Room 3
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Marco Baldi, Marco Bianchi, and Franco Chiaraluce
Non-Systematic Codes for Physical Layer Security
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Abstract:
This paper is a first study on the usage of non-systematic codes
based on scrambling matrices for physical layer security. The
chance of implementing transmission security at the physical layer
is known since many years, but it is now gaining an increasing
interest due to its several possible applications. It has been
shown that channel coding techniques can be effectively exploited
for designing physical layer security schemes, in such a way that an
unauthorized receiver, experiencing a channel different from that of
the authorized receiver, is not able to gather any information.
Recently, it has been proposed to exploit puncturing techniques in
order to reduce the security gap between the authorized and
unauthorized channels. In this paper, we show that the security gap
can be further reduced by using non-systematic codes, able to
scramble information bits within the transmitted codeword.
Mon 30 Aug, 16.40-17.00, Room 3
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Yuval Cassuto and Zvonimir Bandic
Low-Complexity Wire-Tap Codes with Security and Error-Correction Guarantees
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Abstract:
New code constructions are proposed for the wire-tap channel with
security and error-correction guarantees. For the case of error-free
main channels, two families of codes are constructed with optimal
encoding and decoding complexities for their wire-tap security. For
the case of main channels with errors, two concatenation types are
studied for the wire-tap and error-correcting codes. For each of
these concatenated schemes, code families are constructed that give
optimal cooperation between the wire-tap and error-correction
properties. The motivation to study low-complexity wire-tap codes
with security and error-correction guarantees comes from data
storage applications. Due to imperfect physical erasure processes,
important secret information needs to be protected from adversarial
access to residual, post erasure, information, and at the same time
be protected from errors when read by the legitimate device user.
Mon 30 Aug, 17.00-17.20, Room 3
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Romar dela Cruz, Annika Meyer, and Patrick Solé
An extension of Massey scheme for secret sharing
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Abstract:
We consider an extension of Massey's construction of secret sharing
schemes using linear codes. We describe the access structure of the
scheme and show its connection to the dual code. We use the
g-fold joint weight enumerator and invariant theory to study the
access structure.
Mon 30 Aug, 17.20-17.40, Room 3
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